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Abstract
We examine the issue of whether two monopolists which produce
substitutable goods should be regulated by one (centralization) or two
(decentralization) regulatory authorities, when the regulator(s) can be
partially captured by industry. Under full information, two decentral-
ized agencies - each regulating a single market - charge lower prices
than a unique regulator, making consumers better o¤. However, this
leads to excessive costs for the taxpayers who subsidize the rms, so
that centralized regulation is preferable. Under asymmetric informa-
tion about the rmscosts, lobbying induces a unique regulator to be
more concerned with the industrys interests, and this decreases social
welfare. When the substitutability between the goods is high enough,
the rmslobbying activity may be so strong that decentralizing the
regulatory structure may be social welfare enhancing.
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1. Introduction
Should a country set up an energy regulator or rather have separate agencies
for gas and electricity? And should we have a single transport authority,
or rather a railways regulator separate from those regulating motorways or
airports? Our paper provides an attempt to explore these issues, focusing our
attention on the regulatory structure and on how to design the jurisdiction
of a regulatory authority when there are two di¤erent but related markets.
Several theoretical contributions to the literature on regulation have in-
vestigated the pattern of government intervention in a single product market,
whose features hinder unfettered competition between rms. Those studies
which have actually considered the regulation of multiproduct industries have
been mostly concerned with the problem of determining which rms will sup-
ply which products.1 Our focus is thus not on the number of rms, but on
the number of regulators.
We assume that a benevolent political principal (the Congress) can dele-
gate the regulation of two interdependent markets either to a unique regulator
(a regime dened as centralization) or to two di¤erent authorities (decentral-
ization). Regulation may be non-benevolent since it can be captured by
the rmslobbying activities. Our model predicts that under complete in-
formation, where lobbying is not protable, regulatory centralization is the
best option for the Congress. As long as regulation is benevolent, market
interdependence implies that the centralized (cooperative) regime allows one
to internalize all the relevant e¤ects and thus improves social welfare. This
intuitive result covers a distributional issue of some interest: decentralizing
the regulation yields higher quantities than under centralization, making con-
sumers better o¤. However, this leads to excessive costs for the taxpayers,
who subsidize the rms, and this is detrimental to social welfare.
If rms have private information about their costs, there is scope for lob-
bying and we nd that a unique regulator is more distorted to the industrys
interests as a result of the competition between rms at the lobbying stage.
A trade-o¤ emerges in equilibrium between the market interdependence ef-
fect and the lobbying e¤ect. When the substitutability between goods is high
enough, the latter e¤ect may outweigh the former, so that decentralizing the
regulatory structure can increase social welfare. The decentralized (noncoop-
erative) regime turns out to be a good structural response to non-benevolent
regulation since it alleviates the capture problem.
The design of the regulatory jurisdiction in interdependent markets is an
1See, among others, Gilbert and Riordan [9] for an analysis of the advantages and
disadvantages of bundled and unbundled supply in multiproduct industries.
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issue which, despite its theoretical and empirical importance, has been only
touched by the literature on optimal regulation, so that several gaps remain.2
The issue of the separation of powers has indeed been addressed in the
theory of regulation. Among others, La¤ont and Martimort [12] consider
the problem of monitoring a regulated rm which has private information
about some pieces of its activity. The authors argue that when regulation
makes collusive o¤ers that are accepted by the rm whatever its character-
istics, splitting regulatory rights on some aspects of the rms performance
between di¤erent agencies may act as a device against the threat of regula-
tory capture. Separation turns out to be desirable since it reduces regulatory
discretion in engaging in socially wasteful activities. In our setting, we show
that decentralized regulation can mitigate the adverse e¤ect of lobbying in
a context of interdependent markets since the noncooperative regulatory be-
havior removes the competition between rms at the lobbying stage.3
Another stream of literature which is relevant for our work is the mul-
tiprincipal incentive theory. Baron [2] examines the regulation of a non-
localized externality by two di¤erent agencies and compares the noncoop-
erative equilibrium with the case in which the two regulators are allowed
to coordinate their activities. Contrary to our paper, regulatory agencies
represent conicting interests since they have di¤erent mandates. Moreover,
lobbying by industry is not an issue. In a reduced-form model with two
agencies which exhibit di¤erent objectives in presence of regulatory capture,
Martimort [15] shows that the duplication of non-benevolent regulators may
improve social welfare. This shares some similarities with our analysis, even
though our results are driven by market interdependence by endogenizing
the lobbying stage.
Our model is nally related to the well-known capture theory of economic
regulation, whose seminal contribution traces back to Stigler [20]. Following
his paradigm, we assume that the industry is able to mobilize regulatory
2For a recent survey, see Armstrong and Sappington [1].
3A relevant stream of literature analyzes the trade-o¤ between centralization and de-
centralization in economic organizations (see Poitevin [18] for a review on this topic).
La¤ont and Martimort [11] show that under certain conditions a decentralized structure
can alleviate the problem of collusion if there are limits on communication between the
principal and the agents. With this literature we share the assumption that the delegation
process is imperfect, so that regulators may have private agendas. However, their results
are driven by very di¤erent forces from those operating in our setting: decentralization
(that they call delegation) implies an extention of the organizational hierarchy, which
can be protable when the principal cannot communicate with the bottom-level agent. In
our model, decentralization means separation of the regulatory jurisdiction between two
noncooperative agencies and its superiority in terms of social welfare is a consequence of
the way the interdependence between markets a¤ects the lobbying stage.
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powers to obtain favours, since it has greater incentives than dispersed con-
sumers and taxpayers with a low per-capita stake to get organized in order
to exercise political inuence.4 Obviously, regulated rms must incur some
costs when lobbying the agency (La¤ont and Tirole [13]). Following Mar-
timort [15], we assume that the capture can only be partial, and that it
materializes in a higher weight which the regulator puts on prots in her
objective function.5
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the basic struc-
tures of the model. In Section 3 we compute the full information pricing
policies and we study their impact on the welfare of the agents involved. In
Section 4 we derive the regulatory outcome under both regimes in the case
of asymmetric cost information and make the welfare comparisons. Finally,
Section 5 is devoted to some concluding remarks.
2. The basic model
We consider two symmetric markets for substitutable goods. Following Singh
and Vives [19], the consumersgross utility from the marketplace is repre-
sented by a quadratic utility function of the form
U (q1; q2) = q1 + q2   1
2
 
q21 + 2q1q2 + q
2
2

, (1)
where qi denotes the quantity for good i = 1; 2 and ,  are positive para-
meters;  2 [0; ) expresses the degree of substitutability between goods.6
The consumer surplus net of expenditures on goods is given by
CS (q1; q2) = U (q1; q2)  p1q1   p2q2. (2)
The inverse demand function pi (qi; qj) for good i is thus7
4It is anyway worth quoting the contribution of Miller III et al. [16] who informally
argue that centralization should alter the relative rates of return to lobbying for various
coalitions, generally in favour of groups having di¤use interests which can focus their
lobbying against rent-creating regulation on one location rather than splitting those e¤orts
among a variety of regulatory agencies.
5Addressing a di¤erent issue, Calzolari and Scarpa [7] also suggest that the rm can
induce the regulator to be biased towards prots.
6All these assumptions ensure that U (:) is strictly concave and guarantee the positivity
of direct demand functions q1 (:) and q2 (:) not derived here.
7Vives [22, ch. 6] shows analytically that, under some basic conditions, if two goods are
gross substitutes, which means @Di(p)@pj  0, i 6= j, where Di (p) = qi is the direct demand
for good i and p is the price vector, then we have @Pi(q)@qj  0, i 6= j, where Pi (q) = pi is
the inverse demand for good i and q is the quantity vector.
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pi (qi; qj) =   qi   qj. (3)
The markets are run by monopolies. The prot of rm i is
i (qi; qj; Si) = pi (qi; qj)  qi + Si   Ci (qi) , (4)
where Si is the subsidy which may accrue to rm i via the regulatory process
(see below). The total cost of rm i is
Ci (qi) = ciqi + fi, (5)
where ci 2 (0; ) is the marginal cost of rm i and fi > 0 is rm is xed
cost of production. We will later concentrate on symmetric equilibria (where
c1 = c2 = c and f1 = f2 = f).
In line with the literature, the Congress is a benevolent maximizer of a
social welfare function, which is given by
W (q1; S1; q2; S2) = CS (q1; q2)  S1   S2. (6)
This means that the Congress cares about consumer surplus net of the
subsidization of rms nanced by taxpayers via the regulatory process.8
Regulator(s) can be partially captured by industries. Following Marti-
mort [15], the result of such a partial capture is that the regulatory activity
is distorted to industrys interests. The regulatory objective function is then
the sum of social welfare W in (6) and (a share of) the prots i in (4).
A decentralized regulator for market i only cares about the prot of rm
i, to which she attaches a weight equal to 'Di 2 [0; 1],9 while centralized regu-
lation gives a weight 'Ci to the prots of each rm. Formally, a decentralized
regulator for market i maximizes
V Di (qi; Si; :) = CS (qi; qj)  Si   Sj + 'Di i (7)
8Baron [3] shows that if there is a strong electoral connection between the benets de-
livered to constituents and their electoral support, the legislature will choose a regulatory
mandate that favors consumer over producer interests and results in regulation that does
not maximize expected total surplus. The Congressobjective can be also thought as a
response to the regulatory capture. In our setting of imperfect delegation, the Congress
does not have time, resources and expertise to discover the lobbying activity exerted by
the rms and it cannot give the regulator the right monetary incentives to completely
internalize its objectives. Neven and Röller [17] suggest that when competition author-
itys o¢ cials are exposed to the lobbying of rms that can o¤er them personal rewards a
consumer welfare standard might counterbalance the bias resulting from such lobbying.
9In other words, it would be too costly for one rm to lobby the regulator in the other
market.
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and the objective of a unique regulator is
V C (q1; S1; q2; S2) = CS (q1; q2)  S1   S2 + 'C1 1 + 'C2 2. (8)
The regulatory instruments are the quantity and the subsidy to the rm
in each market. Even though in some sectors price regulation seems to be
more natural, in relevant industries like electricity, gas and transport, which
are characterized by network assets with limited capacity, the choice of scale
plays a crucial role as it yields transmission constraints. A common way in
the literature to model this feature is to consider the quantity as a choice
variable since the entire capacity is dumped on the market.10 Notice that this
formulation implies a sort of quantity competition between regulators under
decentralization. This is in line with empirical works of some relevance, which
corroborate the idea that binding infrastructure capacity restrictions induce
Cournot behavior.11
It is worth stressing that the choice of the objective function is not cen-
tral to our analysis and the results we obtain. Nothing substantial would
change in our results, if we assumed that the Congress were to set an objec-
tive function with a positive weight on prots, and rms lobby to increase
that weight in the regulatory objective function(s). In the same way, the reg-
ulatory problems would not be a¤ected, if we assumed that each regulator
only cares about the subsidization of her regulated rm.12
The weights 'Di and '
C
i are driven by the rms lobbying activities.
These weights depend on the amount of expenditure incurred to inuence
the agency, which is nanced through prots that the rm receives in equi-
librium. In other terms, the regulators concern 'ki in regime k (k = C;D)
with the rent of rm i is the outcome of the following maximization problem
max
'ki 2[0;1]

ki
 
'ki ; '
k
j
    'ki  , (9)
where  (:)  0 (with  (0) = 0) is the cost (identical for both rms) of
lobbying activity, which is increasing and convex in 'ki (
0
> 0, 
00
> 0).
This setting captures the idea originated by Stigler [20] that interest groups
choose to inuence the government at a level where their marginal benet
equals their marginal cost.
10See on this topic Tirole [21, ch. 5].
11See Egging and Gabriel [8] and Holz et al. [10] for empirical evidence about the
European natural gas market. Bushnell et al. [6] focus on the U.S. electicity sector.
12The subsidy of the other rm represents an exogenous variable in the regulators
optimization program, which disappears in the rst-order condition.
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3. The full information benchmark
In each market the regulatory agency has two instruments, i.e. quantity
qi and subsidy Si to rm i. Under complete information the timing of the
regulatory game is the following.
(I) The Congress decides to delegate regulation of two interdependent
markets either to a unique agency or two di¤erent authorities.
(II) Firms engage in a lobbying activity to induce the regulator(s) to
internalize (at least in part) their prots in the objective function.
(III) Under decentralization the regulator for market i independently
makes a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er of a regulatory mechanism MDi =

qDi ; S
D
i
	
to rm i. Under centralization the unique agency simultaneously o¤ers a
regulatory policy MCi =

qCi ; S
C
i
	
to each rm.
(IV) Each rm can either accept or reject the o¤er. If it refuses the
proposed policy, the rm does not produce and earns zero prots.
(V) If the rm accepts, the contract is executed and the regulatory policy
is implemented.
Our regulatory model is a two-stage game. At the rst stage, the rms
lobbying activity determines the weight of prots in the regulatory objective
function(s). At the second stage, each regulator chooses the policy which
maximizes her objective function. We solve this game by backward induction.
The two alternatives we consider di¤er in the number of markets (or rms)
the regulator is responsible for and (possibly) the value assigned to prots.
Let us analyze them in sequence.
3.1. Prices under decentralization
Let us rst consider the regulatory setting in which two di¤erent agencies
coexist. We label this environment as decentralization.
At the nal stage, the regulator in charge of market i sets the quantity
qi and the subsidy Si, in order to maximize the consumer surplus CS net of
subsidies (S1 + S2) plus the prots of rm i weighted by a given parameter
'Di 2 [0; 1] determined at the previous stage, which represents the value the
regulator assigns to each dollar of rm is rent. Substituting (2) and (4) into
(7), the objective of the regulator for market i is the following
max
qi;Si
qi + qj   1
2
 
q2i + 2qiqj + q
2
j
  pi (qi; qj)  qi
 pj (qi; qj)  qj   Si   Sj + 'Di i (10)
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s:t: i  0, (PCi)
where the participation constraint (PCi) states that rm i is willing to pro-
duce only if it receives from the regulatory mechanism at least its reservation
prot (normalized to zero). Referring to Appendix A for the details, from
the rst-order condition for qi the regulated quantity for good i is given by
qDi  qD =
  c

. (11)
Replacing (11) into (3) yields the full information pricing policy. This
result is emphasized in the following Lemma.
Lemma 1 Under complete information, decentralized regulation yields a price
for good i equal to
pDi  pD = c  z (  c) , (12)
where z  

2 [0; 1).
Notice from (12) that as markets are independent (z = 0) we nd the
standard marginal cost pricing. As c 2 (0; ), the substitutability between
the goods (z > 0) reduces equilibrium prices below marginal costs.
At the rst stage, each rm engages in a lobbying activity, which deter-
mines the weight the regulator is willing to attach to prots. As specied
above, we assume that this weight depends on the amount of expenditure
incurred to inuence the agency. In other words, in line with (9) the reg-
ulators concern 'Di with the rent of rm i is the outcome of the following
maximization problem
max
'Di 2[0;1]

Di
 
'Di ; '
D
j
    'Di  . (13)
Since 'Di 2 [0; 1] and then there is no reason to leave the rm any rents,
i.e. Di = 0, it is immediate to see that '
D
1 = '
D
2  'D = 0 in equilibrium. In
other words, no rm has incentives to lobby the regulator, since it anticipates
that it will get zero prots anyway.
3.2. The case of centralization
The alternative regulatory environment we consider is one where a single
agency is given the responsibility for both markets. We label this environ-
ment as centralization.
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At the second stage, this regulator determines the quantities q1 and q2 and
subsidies S1 and S2 in order to maximize the regulators objective function.
Replacing (2) and (4) into (8), the regulators program is the following
max
q1;q2;S1;S2
q1 + q2   1
2
 
q21 + 2q1q2 + q
2
2

 p1 (q1; q2)  q1   p2 (q1; q2)  q2   S1   S2 + 'C1 1 + 'C2 2 (14)
s:t: (PC1), (PC2).
Appendix B shows the solution to the problem in (14). From the rst-
order condition for qi the regulated quantity for good i is given by
qCi  qC =
  c
 (1 + z)
. (15)
We can see from (15) that substitutability reduces the equilibrium output.
A unique regulator nds it optimal to curb production of substitutes, since
consumers can move from one market to the other.
Let us now derive the complete-information pricing policy under regula-
tory centralization. This is shown in the following Lemma.
Lemma 2 Under complete information, centralized regulation yields a price
for good i equal to
pCi  pC = c: (16)
Observe from (16) that the price set by a single regulator equals marginal
costs, independently of substitutability between goods.
As under decentralization, at the rst stage lobbying occurs which yields
the weight given to prots in the regulatory objective function. Hence, the
regulatory concern 'Ci with prots of rm i is the outcome of the following
maximization problem
max
'Ci 2[0;1]

Ci
 
'Ci ; '
C
j
    'Ci  . (17)
Since Di = 0, even under centralization lobbying activity is not protable
in case of complete information and then 'C1 = '
C
2  'C = 0.
From the analysis above we can conclude that
' = 'D   'C = 0, (18)
so that in both regimes lobbying does not emerge in equilibrium. This con-
rms the well-known idea that in absence of asymmetric information, regu-
lated rms are unable to extract rents and therefore have no incentives to
inuence regulatory outcomes.
9
3.3. Welfare comparisons
Let us now compare the welfare of each agent a¤ected by the regulatory
outcome under the two regimes. We start comparing price levels, which turn
out to be crucial for the analysis of our main results. Taking the di¤erence
between prices in (12) and (16) immediately yields
pD   pC  p =  z (  c) =  I (z) , (19)
where
I (z)  z (  c)  0 (20)
as c 2 (0; ). Notice that (19) is negative as long as goods are substitutes.
We know from (16) that prices under centralization are not a¤ected by sub-
stitutability. On the contrary, (12) shows that with market interdependence
- as consumers can switch from one good to the other - the noncooperative
behavior of regulators pushes prices below marginal costs. Hence, a mar-
ket interdependence e¤ect, denoted by I (z), occurs under full information
and yields a downward price distortion under decentralization that denitely
benets consumers.
We can show now our rst relevant results, which will be proved and
commented upon in di¤erent steps.
Proposition 3 Assume that z 2 (0; 1), i.e. goods are substitutes. Then,
under complete information, regulatory decentralization
(i) increases consumer surplus, i.e. CSD > CSC
(ii) increases subsidies, i.e. SD > SC
(iii) decreases social welfare, i.e. WD < WC.
Starting from point (i) in Proposition 3, we plug (11) and (15) into (2) in
order to nd the di¤erence in consumer surplus between the two regulatory
regimes, which after some manipulations can be written as
CSD   CSC  CS = z 2 + z
 (1 + z)
(  c)2 . (21)
Substitutability between goods implies that expression (21) is strictly pos-
itive (CSD > CSC), so decentralization makes consumers better o¤. This is
a straightforward consequence of lower prices under this regime, as is evident
from (19).
Coming to subsidies, notice that regulated prices are lower under de-
centralization, but equilibrium prots are zero in all cases. This can work
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because of subsidies which are bound to be lower under centralized regula-
tion. To be more precise, let us now compute the amount of subsidies the
rms receive (to show point (ii) in Proposition 3). Substituting (11) and
(15) into (4), we obtain after some computations the di¤erence in subsidies
granted to each rm between the two regulatory regimes, which is given by
SD   SC  S = z

(  c)2 . (22)
Not surprisingly, (22) shows that the higher production under decentral-
ization requires a greater subsidization (SD > SC) which reduces taxpayer
welfare.
As from (6) the Congress cares about the consumer surplus net of subsi-
dies nanced by taxpayers, using (21) and (22) the di¤erence in social welfare
between the two regimes can be written after some computations as
WD  WC  W =   z
2
 (1 + z)
(  c)2 . (23)
Notice from (23) that, as we have emphasized in point (iii) of Proposition
3, substitutability between goods yields higher social welfare under central-
ization (WD < WC). The excess subsidy given under decentralization entails
a welfare loss which more than compensates the higher consumer surplus.
In a sense, this is the result one would have expected. Under complete
information, nothing interferes with the regulators ability to maximize her
objective function which, as long as ' 2 [0; 1], entails that prots are zero
independently of the weight each regulator gives to the private rms prof-
its (see Baron and Myerson [5]). Therefore, lobbying is not protable, and
having one powerful regulator, in charge of both markets, yields a better out-
come. However, what we consider striking is that the (predictable) aggregate
result conceals a relevant distributional issue: consumers would be better o¤
with two independent regulators, but this would happen at an excessively
large cost for taxpayers.
4. Prices under asymmetric information
Let us now assume that each rm has private information about its marginal
cost ci. The regulator has only imperfect prior knowledge about ci, repre-
sented by a density function f (ci), which is assumed to be continuous and
positive on the domain [c ; c+]. The corresponding cumulative distribution
function is given by F (ci) =
R ci
c f (eci) deci 2 [0; 1].
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Under asymmetric information the timing of the regulatory game is the
following.
(I) Nature draws an independently and identically distributed type ci for
rm i, according to the density function f (ci).
(II) Firms engage in a lobbying activity to induce the regulator(s) to
internalize (at least in part) their prots in the objective function.
(III) Each rm learns its type.
(IV) Under decentralization, each regulator independently o¤ers a direct
incentive compatible mechanism MDi =

qDi (bci) ; SDi (bci)	 where the output
qi (:) and the subsidy Si (:) targeted to rm i are contingent on its own reportbci 2 [c ; c+]. Each rm is induced to reveal honestly its private information,
so that in equilibrium we have bci = ci.13 Under centralization, a unique
regulator can make the regulatory policy contingent on the declarations of
both rms, so she simultaneously o¤ers MCi =

qCi (bci;bcj) ; SCi (bci;bcj)	.
(V) Each rm can either accept or reject the o¤er. If it refuses the
proposed policy, the rm does not produce and earns zero prots.
(VI) If the rm accepts, the contract is executed and the regulatory policy
is implemented.
As shown in Appendix C, a local necessary condition for incentive com-
patibility, which is also globally su¢ cient if qi (:) is non-increasing in ci, is
given by the following expression
c+Z
c 
i (ci; :) f (cj) dcj =
c+Z
c 
i
 
c+; :

f (cj) dcj +
c+Z
c 
c+Z
ci
@Ci (eci; :)
@eci decif (cj) dcj.
(ICCi)
This condition states that the expected prot of rm i must be equal to
the expected prot of the most ine¢ cient rm plus an expected informational
rent (captured by the double integral) which represents the reward to the rm
for revealing truthfully its private information. Notice that, as markets are
interdependent, when signing the contract each rm can only predict the
expected value of its prot, which depends on the costs of the other rm.
13The revelation principle ensures that, without any loss of generality, the regulator
may be restricted to direct incentive compatible policies, which require the rm to report
its cost parameter and which give the rm no incentive to lie. For an application of the
revelation principle to regulation, see the seminal paper of Baron and Myerson [5].
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4.1. Prices with decentralization
A decentralized regulator maximizes (7) in expected terms since she designs
the policy mechanism before knowing the rms cost. Using (2) and (4), at
the second stage the maximization problem is the following
max
qi(ci);Si(ci)
c+Z
c 
c+Z
c 

qi (ci) + qj (cj)  1
2
 
q2i (ci) + 2qi (ci)  qj (cj) + q2j (cj)

 pi (qi (ci) ; qj (cj))  qi (ci)  pj (qi (ci) ; qj (cj))  qj (cj)
 Si (ci)  Sj + 'Di i

f (ci) f (cj) dcidcj, s:t: (24)
c+Z
c 
i (ci; :) f (cj) dcj  0 (PCi)
c+Z
c 
i (ci; :) f (cj) dcj =
c+Z
c 
i
 
c+; :

f (cj) dcj+
c+Z
c 
c+Z
ci
qi (eci) decif (cj) dcj, (ICCi)
where the incentive compatibility constraint (ICCi) of rm i is derived for
the cost specication in (5). Appendix D shows the solution to the problem
in (24).
From the rst-order condition for qi (:) the quantity produced by rm i
as a function of 'Di is given by
qDi
 
'Di

=
1


  ci  
 
1  'Di

Hi

, (25)
where Hi  F (ci)f(ci)  0 is the hazard rate.14
For the sake of convenience, we focus our attention on the symmetric
case,15 i.e. c1 = c2 = c. Replacing (25) into (3) yields the asymmetric
information prices as functions of the prot weights, which are shown in the
following Lemma.
14The hazard rate Hi is supposed to be increasing in ci. This monotonicity property,
which is met by the most usual distributions, may be interpreted as a decrease in the
conditional probability that there are further cost reductions, given that there has already
been a cost marginal reduction, as the rm becomes more e¢ cient. See La¤ont and Tirole
[14, ch. 1] for a description of this "decreasing return" assumption.
15Notice however from Appendix D that the two cost parameters are independently
drawn from the distribution of costs.
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Lemma 4 Under asymmetric cost information, decentralized regulation yields
a price for good i equal to
pDi
 
'Di ; '
D
j

= c  z (  c) +H  1  'Di + z  1  'Dj 
= pD +H
 
1  'Di

+ z
 
1  'Dj

, (26)
where pD is dened by (12).
The impact of substitutability on prices is now twofold. On the one hand,
as under full information, higher substitutability yields a reduction in prices.
On the other, the distortion above the complete-information price, captured
by the expression in square brackets, is exacerbated by the substitutability
between goods. To see which e¤ect prevails, notice from (26) that
@pDi
@z
=     c   1  'Dj H < 0,
as qDj > 0 (see (25) inverting i and j). As under complete information, even
though at a lesser extent, given 'Dj a stronger substitutability between goods
reduces prices in equilibrium.
Finally, notice that an increase in the weight 'Dj given to the prots of
the rm j yields a reduction in the equilibrium price pDi as long as goods
are substitutes. Indeed, a higher quantity produced in market j when the
regulator is more prot distorted decreases the price for the substitutable
good i (see (3)).
4.2. Pricing policy under centralization
Substituting (2) and (4) into (8) evaluated in expected terms, the maxi-
mization program of a unique regulator under asymmetric information is the
following
max
q1(c1;c2);q2(c1;c2);S1(c1;c2);S2(c1;c2)
c+Z
c 
c+Z
c 
[q1 (c1; c2) + q2 (c1; c2)
 1
2
 
q21 (c1; c2) + 2q1 (c1; c2)  q2 (c1; c2) + q22 (c1; c2)

 p1 (q1 (c1; c2) ; q2 (c1; c2))  q1 (c1; c2)  p2 (q1 (c1; c2) ; q2 (c1; c2))  q2 (c1; c2)]
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 S1 (c1; c2)  S2 (c1; c2) + 'C1 1 + 'C2 2

f (c1) f (c2) dc1dc2 (27)
s:t: (PC1), (PC2), (ICC1), (ICC2).
Notice that with independently and identically distributed cost draws the
incentive compatibility constraints under centralization are a straightforward
extension of those derived in Appendix C for the case of decentralization. The
only di¤erence is that now the quantity is contingent on the declaration of
both rms. Appendix E shows the solution to the problem in (27).
From the rst-order condition for qi (:), restricting our attention on the
symmetric case (c1 = c2 = c) the regulated quantity for good i as a function
of 'Ci and '
C
j can be written after some manipulations as
qCi
 
'Ci ; '
C
j

=
1
 (1 + z)

  c   1  'Ci H+ z 'Ci   'Cj (1  z2)H. (28)
Notice from (28) that
@qCi
@'Cj
=   z
 (1  z2)H  0. (29)
Centralized regulation brings about a sort of competition between the
rms, which has implication for their lobbying activities. A higher weight
obtained by rm j on its prots harms rm i, which is allowed to produce
(and earn) less, as the goods are substitutes.
We are now in a position to derive the asymmetric information prices as
a function of prot weights. This is done in the following Lemma.
Lemma 5 Under asymmetric cost information, centralized regulation yields
a price for good i equal to
pCi
 
'Ci

= c+
 
1  'Ci

H. (30)
Notice from (30) that the price charged by a single regulator is distorted
above marginal costs due to asymmetric information, independently of the
substitutability between goods. Hence, in both regulatory structures asym-
metric information increases prices. However, under centralization the regu-
lated price is above marginal cost, while this is not necessarily the case under
decentralization (see (26)).
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4.3. Equilibrium lobbying activities
Now that we have derived the equilibrium prices/quantities in the regulation
stage (as functions of the prot weights 'ki , with k = C;D), we can proceed
backwards to determine the equilibrium levels of lobbying activities, using
(9). To this end, we need to calculate the expected prots on the basis of
equilibrium quantities, as lobbying is assumed to take place before rms learn
their private information.
In case of decentralization, after substituting the equilibrium prot from
(ICCi), as determined by (25), into (9) we can derive the weight given by
each agency to the prots of rm i as the solution to
max
'Di 2[0;1]
c+Z
c 
c+Z
c 
c+Z
c
1


  ec   1  'Di H (ec) decf (ci) f (cj) dcidcj     'Di  .
(31)
The (interior) equilibrium value for 'Di must satisfy the following rst-
order condition
 0
 
'Di

=
1

c+Z
c 
c+Z
c 
c+Z
c
H (ec) decf (ci) f (cj) dcidcj,
which states that the equilibrium weight is such that the marginal cost of
lobbying equates the (expected) marginal prot. This implies
'Di  'D = ( 0) 1
 eH

!
, (32)
where eH  R c+
c 
R c+
c 
R c+
c
H (ec) decf (ci) f (cj) dcidcj. Notice from (32) that the
two rms obtain the same weight on their prots, i.e. 'Di  'D, i = 1; 2.
Turning to the case of centralization, we can proceed in an analogous way
using (28) and (9). The weight given to prots by a unique regulator arises
from the following maximization
max
'Ci 2[0;1]
c+Z
c 
c+Z
c 
c+Z
c
1
 (1 + z)

  ec   1  'Ci H (ec)
+z
'Ci   'Cj
1  z H (ec)
#
decf (ci) f (cj) dcidcj     'Ci  . (33)
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The (interior) equilibrium value for 'Ci must satisfy the following rst-
order condition
 0
 
'Ci

=
1
 (1  z2)
c+Z
c 
c+Z
c 
c+Z
c
H (ec) decf (ci) f (cj) dcidcj,
which implies
'Ci  'C = ( 0) 1
 eH
 (1  z2)
!
. (34)
The two rms will get the same weight on their prots in equilibrium, i.e.
'Ci  'C , i = 1; 2.
An important consequence of this analysis, which can be simply obtained
by comparing (32) and (34), is the following.
Proposition 6 In an interior equilibrium, ' (z)  'D   'C (z) : [0; 1)!
( 1; 0), i.e. the weight of prots in the regulatory objective function is higher
under centralization. Moreover, ' (z) is
(a) (strictly) decreasing, i.e. @'(z)
@z
< 0 for z 2 (0; 1)
(b) (strictly) concave, i.e. @
2'(z)
@z2
< 0.
The proof is quite straightforward. Proposition 6 stresses that a single
regulator is more distorted to rmsinterests than two noncooperative agen-
cies. As already pointed out, centralization introduces an implicit element
of competition between the rms in the political market. Each rm is actu-
ally engaged in a sort of competition when lobbying the regulator because a
higher weight on its prots implies a higher output level at the expense of
the other rm (see (29)) and then a higher informational rent. This induces
each rm to exert a larger lobbying e¤ort than under decentralization, which
yields a prot weight that rises at an increasing rate with substitutability
(points (a) and (b)).
4.4. Welfare comparisons
Following the same procedure as in the case of complete information, let us
now compare the welfare of each agent under the two regimes and derive
some policy suggestions. Notice that the above considerations imply that
there is a signicant trade-o¤ to be considered. In a sense, centralization
is "obviously" preferable under complete information, in that a benevolent
regulator will be better able to achieve the social goals when the actions
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in the two markets are fully coordinated. However, things may be di¤erent
under asymmetric information. This is especially true as centralization spurs
lobbying activity. This may be self-defeating: the very notion of a benevolent
regulator is undermined by rmspressures.
Let us start comparing price levels, which will prove to be crucial to the
overall results. After dening    c  1  'DH (with  > 0 as qD > 0),
we derive from (26) and (28) the di¤erence in equilibrium prices between the
two regimes, which it is useful to write as
pD   pC  p =  z  ' (z)H =  I (z) + L (z) , (35)
where
I (z) = z  0 (36)
and
L (z) =  ' (z)H  0, (37)
which is non-negative by Proposition 6. This shows that the impact of sub-
stitutability on equilibrium prices is now twofold. The rst term in (35), i.e.
I (z), captures the (direct) market interdependence e¤ect under asymmet-
ric information, which yields lower prices under decentralization, as in the
case of complete information. The lobbying e¤ect, represented by L (z),
can be seen as a second, indirect e¤ect of substitutability, one which plays
a role only in case of asymmetric information and which entails that prices
under centralization are lower than under decentralization. A single regula-
tor will be exposed to greater lobbying activity and will thus be more prot
oriented; therefore, she will decrease prices in order to increase production
and distribute higher informational rents.
Notice from (35) that asymmetric information inuences the two e¤ects
in the same direction. On the one hand, it mitigates the market interdepen-
dence e¤ect, by making decentralization less convenient for consumers than
under complete information. In fact, this e¤ect is now weaker (I < I), since
asymmetric information (even in the absence of any di¤erences in lobbying
activities, i.e. L = 0) involves a higher distortion in decentralized prices
(see from (26) and (30) of equilibrium that (1 + z) (1  ')H > (1  ')H).
On the other hand, asymmetric information yields a lobbying e¤ect, which
makes centralization relatively more desirable for consumers ( dL
dH
> 0 by (32)
and (34)). Therefore, due to asymmetric information, prices increase in both
regimes. However, they rise more under decentralization than under central-
ization. When this distortion due to asymmetric information is large enough,
the full information result in (19) may well be reversed.
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In order to better understand the situation and to establish our main
results, it is useful to rst consider the following intermediate step.
Lemma 7 Dene the function   (z) : [0; 1) ! R as   (z)  L (z)   I (z) =
 ' (z)H   z . Then, the following is true:
(a)   (0) = 0
(b)   (:) is initially (strictly) decreasing, i.e.  
0
(0) < 0, and then (strictly)
increasing, i.e  
0
(z) > 0 for z large enough
(c)   (:) is (strictly) convex, i.e.  
00
> 0
(d) if H >   z 
'(z)
for some z 2 (0; 1) there exists a unique value of z (call
it z) such that   (z) = 0
(e)   (z) > 0 if and only if z 2 (z; 1) :
Parts (a) to (c) are straightforward consequences of the denitions of  
and' (z) (see Proposition 6). Point (d) stresses that only if the lobbying ef-
fect, when reaching its maximum value (i.e. for z su¢ ciently high), can o¤set
the market interdependence e¤ect (  (:) > 0), then a trade-o¤ between the
two e¤ects emerges. This occurs when asymmetric information is a partic-
ularly relevant issue (H >   z 
'(z)
). Otherwise, the market interdependence
e¤ect always outweighs the lobbying e¤ect and regulatory centralization re-
mains preferable, as with complete information (see also Proposition 8).
For this reason, we focus hereafter on the case in which a threshold value
z 2 (0; 1) exists. The immediate implication of Lemma 7 is that decen-
tralization decreases equilibrium prices as long as substitutability among the
goods is not too high, i.e. z < z. We are now in a position to state our
main results, which we will then discuss in di¤erent steps.
Proposition 8 Assume that z 2 (z; 1), which implies L (z) > I (z). Then,
under asymmetric cost information, regulatory decentralization
i) decreases consumer surplus, i.e. CS
D
< CS
C
ii) decreases prots, i.e. D < C
iii) decreases subsidies, i.e. S
D
< S
C
iv) increases social welfare, i.e. W
D
> W
C
.
Otherwise, the opposite holds.
This result conrms the implications of our complete information analysis,
with the additional trade-o¤brought about by the lobbying e¤ect. Because of
asymmetric information, lobbying becomes potentially e¤ective, and we have
seen that decentralization decreases the incentive to lobby (see Proposition
6).
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In particular, an increase in the degree of substitutability between goods
yields a stronger lobbying e¤ect under centralization, since each rm has
a greater incentive to lobby the unique regulator (see (34)). Notice that
the lobbying e¤ect increases with z faster than the market interdependence
e¤ect. In fact, while the impact of substitutability on the latter e¤ect is
constant (equal to  ), the weight on prots under centralization increases
at an increasing rate because the competition in the political market for
lobbying the regulator becomes tougher and tougher.16 When goods are
closer substitutes, i.e. if z 2 (z; 1), the strength of the lobbying e¤ect
induces the Congress to prefer decentralization.
Most calculations for the proof of the di¤erent parts in Proposition 8
are shown in Appendix F, where we examine each component of the welfare
function, which is expressed as the di¤erence between its value under de-
centralization and under centralization. More precisely, in all cases, we are
able to write the di¤erence between decentralization and centralization as
the sum of three terms: the full information di¤erence, the additional mar-
ket interdependence e¤ect under asymmetric information and the lobbying
e¤ect.
Consumers are better o¤ under the regime which grants the lower prices,
and so are rms, as their rents depend positively on output levels. As the
rents largely come from taxpayers, this categorys interest goes in the oppo-
site direction. Not surprisingly, the latter groups interest prevails. Notice
that the contrast of interests between consumers and shareholders, on the one
hand, and taxpayers, on the other hand, appears in the whole regulation lit-
erature since Baron and Myerson [5]. Relative to a single market regulation,
here we can compare two di¤erent regimes and this comparison highlights
things, which in other analyses remain implicit.
This result suggests that with more interdependent markets a decen-
tralized regime turns out to be a reasonable structural response to non-
benevolent regulation since it mitigates the capture problem in the delegation
of the regulatory authority. The trade-o¤ between the market interdepen-
dence e¤ect and the lobbying e¤ect implies that the welfare gains delivered
to taxpayers under decentralization more than compensate the losses to con-
sumers and rms, so that the Congress will nd it more desirable to decen-
tralize market regulation.
16Notice also that (29) is decreasing in z, which means that the greater substitutability,
the bigger is the negative impact of an increase in prot weight of a rm on the quantity
(and prot) of the other. This denitely exacerbates the competition between the two
rms.
20
5. Concluding remarks
In this paper we have tackled the problem of how to design the jurisdiction
of a regulatory authority when two markets have interdependent demands
and there is the threat of regulatory capture.
Our analysis has shown that under complete information centralized (co-
operative) regulation is the best solution in terms of social welfare. This
intuitive result covers a distributional aspect of great interest. Two nonco-
operative agencies, each regulating a single market, set lower prices than a
single authority and the higher quantities produced in equilibrium increase
consumer welfare. This market interdependence e¤ect denitely benets con-
sumers, but it reduces social welfare.
However, these results may no longer hold under asymmetric cost infor-
mation as a unique regulator is more distorted to rmsinterests as a result
of lobbying activities. In this case, a trade-o¤ emerges in equilibrium be-
tween the market interdependence e¤ect and the lobbying e¤ect. When the
substitutability between goods is high enough, the latter e¤ect outweighs
the former and decentralizing the regulatory structure turns out to be social
welfare enhancing. Hence, a decentralized (noncooperative) regime can be a
good response to the non-benevolent regulation since it alleviates the capture
problem.
We believe that much scope exists for future research in this eld and our
model can be enriched in a variety of directions. We would like to mention
two aspects which are left for future development.
First of all, markets may be also interconnected on the cost side. This
occurs when one good enters into the production process of the other. Ex-
amples of this kind are given by water and electricity, as the former is an
input for the latter.
The second idea concerns the informational framework examined in the
paper. While asymmetric cost information is certainly relevant, limited reg-
ulatory knowledge about market demands would be equally interesting to
consider, especially when demands are interdependent.
We believe that a greater e¤ort in these directions might shed some light
on many other important issues.
Appendix A
After replacing the choice variable Si with i from (4), the regulators opti-
mization problem in (10) may be written as follows
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max
qi;i
qi + qj   1
2
 
q2i + 2qiqj + q
2
j

 pj (qi; qj)  qj   Ci (qi)  Sj  
 
1  'Di

i s:t: (PCi). (38)
Since (38) is decreasing in i, rm i gets zero prots in equilibrium (Di =
0).
Maximizing (38) with respect to qi yields the following rst-order condi-
tion
  qi   ci = 0.
Appendix B
We replace the choice variables S1 and S2 from (4) with 1 and 2, respec-
tively. The regulators optimization program in (14) may be rewritten as
follows
max
q1;q2;1;2
q1 + q2   1
2
 
q21 + 2q1q2 + q
2
2
  C1 (q1)
 C2 (q2) 
 
1  'C1

1  
 
1  'C2

2 s:t: (PC1), (PC2). (39)
Since (39) is decreasing in 1 and 2, the two rms get zero prots in
equilibrium (C1 = 
C
2 = 0). Maximizing (39) with respect to qi, i = 1; 2,
yields the following rst-order condition
  qi   qj   ci = 0.
Appendix C
We derive the local necessary incentive compatibility condition (ICCi) seen
in Section 4 and show that this condition is also globally su¢ cient for the
cost specication in (5) if qi (:) is non-increasing in ci.
The set of global incentive compatible mechanisms satises for any ci;bci 2
[c ; c+] the following constraint
c+Z
c 
i (ci; ci; cj) f (cj) dcj 
c+Z
c 
i (ci; cj) f (cj) dcj 
c+Z
c 
i (bci; ci; cj) f (cj) dcj.
(40)
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Condition (40) requires that rm i does not have any incentive to misrep-
resent its private information, since the expected prot
R c+
c  i (ci; cj) f (cj) dcj
received by revealing truthfully its marginal costs ci 2 [c ; c+] is at least as
great as the expected prot
R c+
c  i (bci; ci; cj) f (cj) dcj it could obtain for any
report bci.
Following the Baron [4] approach and using (4) and (5), the right-hand
side of (40) may be rewritten as
c+Z
c 
i (bci; ci; cj) f (cj) dcj
=
c+Z
c 
[i (bci; cj) + Ci (qi (bci) ;bci)  Ci (qi (bci) ; ci)] f (cj) dcj, (41)
where i (bci; cj)  i (bci;bci; cj). After substituting (41) into (40), we get
c+Z
c 
[i (ci; cj)  i (bci; cj)] f (cj) dcj

c+Z
c 
[Ci (qi (bci) ;bci)  Ci (qi (bci) ; ci)] f (cj) dcj: (42)
Reversing the roles of ci and bci in (40) and (41) yields
c+Z
c 
[i (ci; cj)  i (bci; cj)] f (cj) dcj

c+Z
c 
[Ci (qi (ci) ;bci)  Ci (qi (ci) ; ci)] f (cj) dcj: (43)
Combining (42) and (43) implies
c+Z
c 
[Ci (qi (bci) ;bci)  Ci (qi (bci) ; ci)] f (cj) dcj
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
c+Z
c 
[i (ci; cj)  i (bci; cj)] f (cj) dcj

c+Z
c 
[Ci (qi (ci) ;bci)  Ci (qi (ci) ; ci)] f (cj) dcj. (44)
Dividing the inequalities in (44) by bci  ci for bci > ci and taking the limit
as bci ! ci yields
c+Z
c 
di (ci; cj)
dci
f (cj) dcj =  
c+Z
c 
@Ci (ci; :)
@ci
f (cj) dcj. (45)
After integrating both sides of equation (45) over [ci; c+] and combining
terms, we obtain the local necessary incentive compatibility condition (ICCi)
seen in Section 4
c+Z
c 
i (ci; cj) f (cj) dcj =
c+Z
c 
i
 
c+; cj

f (cj) dcj +
c+Z
c 
c+Z
ci
@Ci (eci; :)
@eci decif (cj) dcj.
(46)
Now we show that condition (46) is also globally su¢ cient for the cost
function in (5) if qi (:) is non-increasing in ci. Plugging
R c+
c  i (bci; cj) f (cj) dcj
from (46) for bci = ci into (45) and using (5) yields
c+Z
c 
i (bci; ci; cj) f (cj) dcj = c
+Z
c 
i
 
c+; cj

f (cj) dcj +
c+Z
c 
c+Z
bci
qi (eci) decif (cj) dcj
+
c+Z
c 
(bci   ci) qi (bci) f (cj) dcj: (47)
If we replace
R c+
c  i (c
+; cj) f (cj) dcj from (46) into (47), we get after some
manipulations
c+Z
c 
i (bci; ci; cj) f (cj) dcj = c
+Z
c 
i (ci; cj) f (cj) dcj  
c+Z
c 
bciZ
ci
qi (eci) decif (cj) dcj
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+c+Z
c 
(bci   ci) qi (bci) f (cj) dcj: (48)
Finally, combining terms in (48) yields
c+Z
c 
i (bci; ci; cj) f (cj) dcj = c
+Z
c 
i (ci; cj) f (cj) dcj
+
c+Z
c 
bciZ
ci
[qi (bci)  qi (eci)] decif (cj) dcj: (49)
The global incentive compatibility condition in (49) is satised for any
ci;bci 2 [c ; c] if the second term on the right-hand side in (49) is non-positive.
Our claim is that this occurs if qi (:) is non-increasing in ci. To see why such
is the case, notice that, if bci  ci, then the (weak) monotonicity of qi (:)
implies that the integral in (49) is non-positive. When bci < ci, then the term
in square brackets in (49) is nonnegative if qi (ci) is a non-increasing function
but reversing the direction of the integral implies that the second term in
(49) is non-positive. Therefore, the local necessary incentive compatibility
condition (ICCi) in (46) is also globally su¢ cient for the cost specication in
(5) provided that qi (:) is non-increasing in ci (su¢ cient condition for this is
the increasing hazard rate property).
Appendix D
We replace the choice variable Si (ci) with i (:) from (4) as shown in Appen-
dix A. Then, substituting (ICCi) into (24) and integrating by parts yields
max
qi(ci);i(c+;:)
c+Z
c 
c+Z
c 

qi (ci) + qj (cj)  1
2
 
q2i (ci) + 2qi (ci)  qj (cj) + q2j (cj)

 pj (qi (ci) ; qj (cj))  qj (cj)  Ci (qi (ci))  Sj
   1  'Di   F (ci)f (ci) qi (ci) + i  c+; :

f (ci) f (cj) dcidcj s:t: (50)
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c+Z
c 
i
 
c+; :

f (cj) dcj  0. (PCi)
Since (50) is decreasing in
R c+
c  i (c
+; :) f (cj) dcj, the regulator nds it
optimal to give zero (expected) prot to the most ine¢ cient rm.
Maximizing pointwise (50) with respect to qi (:) yields the following rst-
order condition
c+Z
c 

  qi (ci)  ci  
 
1  'Di
 F (ci)
f (ci)

f (cj) dcj = 0.
Appendix E
We replace the choice variable Si (c1; c2) with i (:) from (4) as shown in
Appendix B. Then, substituting (ICC1) and (ICC2) into (27) and integrating
by parts yields
max
q1(c1;c2);q2(c1;c2);1(c+;:);2(c+;:)
c+Z
c 
c+Z
c 
[q1 (c1; c2) + q2 (c1; c2)
 1
2
 
q21 (c1; c2) + 2q1 (c1; c2)  q2 (c1; c2) + q22 (c1; c2)
  C1 (q1 (c1; c2))
 C2 (q2 (c1; c2)) 
 
1  'C1
  F (c1)
f (c1)
q1 (c1; c2) + 1
 
c+; :

   1  'C2   F (c2)f (c2) q2 (c1; c2) + 2  c+; :

f (c1) f (c2) dc1dc2 s:t: (51)
c+Z
c 
1
 
c+; :

f (c2) dc2  0
c+Z
c 
2
 
c+; :

f (c1) dc1  0.
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As (51) decreases in
R c+
c  1 (c
+; :) f (c2) dc2 and
R c+
c  2 (c
+; :) f (c1) dc1, the
rms with the highest costs obtain zero (expected) prots in equilibrium.
Maximizing pointwise (51) with respect to qi (:) yields the following rst-
order condition
  qi (ci; cj)  qj (ci; cj)  ci  
 
1  'Ci

= 0.
Appendix F
F.1. Consumer surplus
Substituting (25) and (28) of equilibrium into (2) we nd after some manip-
ulations the (expected) di¤erence in consumer surplus between decentraliza-
tion and centralization. This is given by
E

CS
D   CSC

 E  CS = 1
 (1 + z)
c+Z
c 
c+Z
c 

z (2 + z) 2+
+' (z)H (2  ' (z)H)] f (c1) f (c2) dc1dc2. (52)
This can be written as:
E

CS
D   CSC

 E  CS = z 2 + z
 (1 + z)
(  c)2+
 z 2 + z
 (1 + z)
c+Z
c 
c+Z
c 
 
1  'DH ( +   c) f (c1) f (c2) dc1dc2+
+
1
 (1 + z)
c+Z
c 
c+Z
c 
' (z)H (2  ' (z)H) f (c1) f (c2) dc1dc2. (53)
The rst two addends in (53) capture the impact of the market interde-
pendence e¤ect on consumer surplus. The rst one is the full information
di¤erential in (21), while the second one is the asymmetric information e¤ect
purely due to market interdependence. Notice that entire expression is lower
than under complete information but it is still positive, since it is derived by
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exploiting the denition of  . The third term in (53) comes from the lobby-
ing e¤ect and acts in the opposite direction (as ' (z)  0), since a more
prot-oriented single regulator benets consumers by increasing production
in order to distribute higher informational rents.
Substituting (36) and (37) into (52) we nd after some computations
that the integrand is positive (which implies that decentralization makes
consumers ex post better o¤) if and only if
CS =
 
I (z)  L (z)  I (z) + L (z) + 2  > 0. (54)
It is immediate to see that (54) is satised if I (z) > L (z). Therefore,
consumers are (ex post) better o¤under decentralization if and only if z < z,
i.e. when the market interdependence e¤ect is stronger than the lobbying
e¤ect.
F.2. Prots
Replacing (25) and (28) of equilibrium into (ICC), we nd that the (expected)
di¤erence in prots for each rm between the two regulatory regimes is given
by
E
 
D   C  E ()
=
1
 (1 + z)
c+Z
c 
c+Z
c 
c+Z
c
[z +'H (ec)] decf (c1) f (c2) dc1dc2
=
1
 (1 + z)
c+Z
c 
c+Z
c 
H (z +' (z)H) f (c1) f (c2) dc1dc2, (55)
where the second equality is derived through integration by parts.
From (55) we can see that decentralization benets (ex post) rms when
I (z) > L (z), i.e. if z < z, since rms produce more and get higher infor-
mational rents. Notice that the two e¤ects play exactly the same role as in
consumer surplus.
F.3. Subsidies
Substituting equilibrium outputs in (25) and (28) into (4), we obtain after
some manipulations the (expected) di¤erence in subsidies between the two
regulatory regimes, which is given by
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E

S
D   SC

 E  S
=
1
 (1 + z)
c+Z
c 
c+Z
c 

z 

(1 + z) + 'DH

+' (z)H
 
 + 'C (z)H
	
f (c1) f (c2) dc1dc2: (56)
We can rewrite (56) as follows
E
 
S

=
z

(  c)2
  z
 (1 + z)
c+Z
c 
c+Z
c 

(1 + z)
 
1  'D (  c+  )  'D Hf (c1) f (c2) dc1dc2
+
1
 (1 + z)
c+Z
c 
c+Z
c 
' (z)H
 
 + 'C (z)H

f (c1) f (c2) dc1dc2. (57)
The rst two terms reect the impact of the market interdependence e¤ect
on subsidies. This is the di¤erence between the full information di¤erential
in (22) and the distortion due to asymmetric information. This expression
is positive as with complete information, which implies that the market in-
terdependence e¤ect still induces more subsidization under decentralization.
However, the sign of the second term is ambiguous. When 'D is low enough
it is positive, which implies a lower extra subsidization under decentralization
relative to the case of complete information. The rationale is that the higher
prices (see the second term in (26)) allow two di¤erent regulators to subsidize
relatively less production. When 'D is high the second term in (57) becomes
negative, which implies that the extra subsidization under decentralization is
even greater than with complete information. The third term in (57) repre-
sents the impact of lobbying on subsidies and shows that a unique regulator,
which cares more about the industrys interests, gives rms higher transfers.
Plugging (36) and (37) into (56) we nd after some manipulations that the
integrand is negative (which implies that decentralization makes taxpayers
ex post better o¤) if and only if
S =
 
L (z)  I (z)  L (z) + I (z) +  + 'DH > 0. (58)
Notice that (58) holds if L (z) > I (z) :
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F.4. Social welfare
We compute the (expected) di¤erence in social welfare using (52) and (56).
After some manipulations we nd
E
 
W

=
1
 (1 + z)
c+Z
c 
c+Z
c 
 z  z + 2H'D
 'H2  'C (z) + 'D f (c1) f (c2) dc1dc2: (59)
This can be written as
E

W
D  WC

 E  W =   z2
 (1 + z)
(  c)2
+
z
 (1 + z)
c+Z
c 
c+Z
c 

zH
 
1  'D ( +   c)  2 'DH	 f (c1) f (c2) dc1dc2
  1
 (1 + z)
c+Z
c 
c+Z
c 
'H2
 
'C (z) + 'D

f (c1) f (c2) dc1dc2. (60)
The sum of the rst two terms represents the overall impact of the market
interdependence e¤ect on social welfare. The full information result in (23)
is modied by a term (the double integral in the second line) whose sign
depends on the value of 'D. If the latter is low enough, that term is positive,
so the undesirability of decentralization driven by market interdependence
is reduced, even though it persists. On the contrary, if 'D is high the term
in the second line becomes negative, which means that asymmetric informa-
tion makes decentralization even more detrimental. The third term in (60)
denotes the impact of the lobbying e¤ect on social welfare. The higher this
e¤ect, the more desirable becomes decentralized regulation, which dampens
the amount of subsidies and the rmsprots, both costly in social welfare
terms.
If we insert (36) and (37) into (59) we nd after some algebra that the
integrand is positive (which implies that decentralization is ex post social
welfare improving) if and only if
W =
 
L (z)  I (z)  L (z) + I (z) + 2'DH > 0, (61)
which is satised when L (z) > I (z).
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If the market interdependence e¤ect o¤sets the lobbying e¤ect, then we
get the same result as under complete information, and the Congress still
prefers centralization. This occurs when goods are quite imperfect substi-
tutes, i.e. if z 2 (0; z) : However, when the substitutability between goods
is higher, i.e. if z 2 (z; 1), the lobbying e¤ect prevails and the distortion to
rmsinterests becomes a serious issue under centralization.
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